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TS.1 Framing and Context
This chapter frames the context, knowledge-base and assessment 
approaches used to understand the impacts of 1.5°C global warming 
above pre-industrial levels and related global greenhouse gas 
emission pathways, building on the IPCC Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5), in the context of strengthening the global response to the 
threat of climate change, sustainable development and efforts to 
eradicate poverty. 
Human-induced warming reached approximately 1°C (likely) 
between 0.8°C and 1.2°C) above pre-industrial levels in 2017, 
increasing at 0.2°C (likely between 0.1°C and 0.3°C) per 
decade (high confidence). Global warming is defined in this report 
as an increase in combined surface air and sea surface temperatures 
averaged over the globe and over a 30-year period. Unless otherwise 
specified, warming is expressed relative to the period 1850–1900, 
used as an approximation of pre-industrial temperatures in AR5. 
For periods shorter than 30 years, warming refers to the estimated 
average temperature over the 30 years centred on that shorter 
period, accounting for the impact of any temperature fluctuations 
or trend within those 30 years. Accordingly, warming from pre-
industrial levels to the decade 2006–2015 is assessed to be 0.87°C 
(likely between 0.75°C and 0.99°C). Since 2000, the estimated level 
of human-induced warming has been equal to the level of observed 
warming with a likely range of ±20% accounting for uncertainty due 
to contributions from solar and volcanic activity over the historical 
period (high confidence). {1.2.1}
Warming greater than the global average has already been 
experienced in many regions and seasons, with higher average 
warming over land than over the ocean (high confidence). Most 
land regions are experiencing greater warming than the global average, 
while most ocean regions are warming at a slower rate. Depending 
on the temperature dataset considered, 20–40% of the global human 
population live in regions that, by the decade 2006–2015, had already 
experienced warming of more than 1.5°C above pre-industrial in at 
least one season (medium confidence). {1.2.1, 1.2.2}
Past emissions alone are unlikely to raise global-mean 
temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels (medium 
confidence), but past emissions do commit to other 
changes, such as further sea level rise (high confidence). If all 
anthropogenic emissions (including aerosol-related) were reduced 
to zero immediately, any further warming beyond the 1°C already 
experienced would likely be less than 0.5°C over the next two to 
three decades (high confidence), and likely less than 0.5°C on a 
century time scale (medium confidence), due to the opposing effects 
of different climate processes and drivers. A warming greater than 
1.5°C is therefore not geophysically unavoidable: whether it will 
occur depends on future rates of emission reductions. {1.2.3, 1.2.4}
1.5°C emission pathways are defined as those that, given 
current knowledge of the climate response, provide a one-
in-two to two-in-three chance of warming either remaining 
below 1.5°C or returning to 1.5°C by around 2100 following 
an overshoot. Overshoot pathways are characterized by the peak 
magnitude of the overshoot, which may have implications for 
impacts. All 1.5°C pathways involve limiting cumulative emissions 
of long-lived greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and nitrous 
oxide, and substantial reductions in other climate forcers (high 
confidence). Limiting cumulative emissions requires either reducing 
net global emissions of long-lived greenhouse gases to zero before 
the cumulative limit is reached, or net negative global emissions 
(anthropogenic removals) after the limit is exceeded. {1.2.3, 1.2.4, 
Cross-Chapter Boxes 1 and 2}
This report assesses projected impacts at a global average 
warming of 1.5°C and higher levels of warming. Global warming 
of 1.5°C is associated with global average surface temperatures 
fluctuating naturally on either side of 1.5°C, together with warming 
substantially greater than 1.5°C in many regions and seasons (high 
confidence), all of which must be considered in the assessment of 
impacts. Impacts at 1.5°C of warming also depend on the emission 
pathway to 1.5°C. Very different impacts result from pathways 
that remain below 1.5°C versus pathways that return to 1.5°C 
after a substantial overshoot, and when temperatures stabilize at 
1.5°C versus a transient warming past 1.5°C (medium confidence). 
{1.2.3, 1.3} 
Ethical considerations, and the principle of equity in particular, 
are central to this report, recognizing that many of the impacts 
of warming up to and beyond 1.5°C, and some potential 
impacts of mitigation actions required to limit warming to 
1.5°C, fall disproportionately on the poor and vulnerable (high 
confidence). Equity has procedural and distributive dimensions and 
requires fairness in burden sharing both between generations and 
between and within nations. In framing the objective of holding the 
increase in the global average temperature rise to well below 2°C 
above pre-industrial levels, and to pursue efforts to limit warming to 
1.5°C, the Paris Agreement associates the principle of equity with the 
broader goals of poverty eradication and sustainable development, 
recognising that effective responses to climate change require a 
global collective effort that may be guided by the 2015 United 
Nations Sustainable Development Goals. {1.1.1}
Climate adaptation refers to the actions taken to manage 
impacts of climate change by reducing vulnerability and 
exposure to its harmful effects and exploiting any potential 
benefits. Adaptation takes place at international, national and 
local levels. Subnational jurisdictions and entities, including urban 
and rural municipalities, are key to developing and reinforcing 
measures for reducing weather- and climate-related risks. Adaptation 
implementation faces several barriers including lack of up-to-date and 
locally relevant information, lack of finance and technology, social 
values and attitudes, and institutional constraints (high confidence). 
Adaptation is more likely to contribute to sustainable development 
when policies align with mitigation and poverty eradication goals 
(medium confidence). {1.1, 1.4} 
Ambitious mitigation actions are indispensable to limit 
warming to 1.5°C while achieving sustainable development 
and poverty eradication (high confidence). Ill-designed responses, 
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however, could pose challenges especially – but not exclusively – for 
countries and regions contending with poverty and those requiring 
significant transformation of their energy systems. This report focuses 
on ‘climate-resilient development pathways’, which aim to meet the 
goals of sustainable development, including climate adaptation and 
mitigation, poverty eradication and reducing inequalities. But any 
feasible pathway that remains within 1.5°C involves synergies and 
trade-offs (high confidence). Significant uncertainty remains as to 
which pathways are more consistent with the principle of equity. 
{1.1.1, 1.4}
Multiple forms of knowledge, including scientific evidence, 
narrative scenarios and prospective pathways, inform the 
understanding of 1.5°C. This report is informed by traditional 
evidence of the physical climate system and associated impacts and 
vulnerabilities of climate change, together with knowledge drawn 
from the perceptions of risk and the experiences of climate impacts 
and governance systems. Scenarios and pathways are used to 
explore conditions enabling goal-oriented futures while recognizing 
the significance of ethical considerations, the principle of equity, and 
the societal transformation needed. {1.2.3, 1.5.2} 
There is no single answer to the question of whether it 
is feasible to limit warming to 1.5°C and adapt to the 
consequences. Feasibility is considered in this report as the 
capacity of a system as a whole to achieve a specific outcome. The 
global transformation that would be needed to limit warming to 
1.5°C requires enabling conditions that reflect the links, synergies 
and trade-offs between mitigation, adaptation and sustainable 
development. These enabling conditions are assessed across many 
dimensions of feasibility – geophysical, environmental-ecological, 
technological, economic, socio-cultural and institutional – that 
may be considered through the unifying lens of the Anthropocene, 
acknowledging profound, differential but increasingly geologically 
significant human influences on the Earth system as a whole. This 
framing also emphasises the global interconnectivity of past, present 
and future human–environment relations, highlighting the need and 
opportunities for integrated responses to achieve the goals of the 
Paris Agreement. {1.1, Cross-Chapter Box 1}
TS.2 Mitigation Pathways Compatible 
with 1.5°C in the Context of 
Sustainable Development
This chapter assesses mitigation pathways consistent with limiting 
warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. In doing so, it explores 
the following key questions: What role do CO2 and non-CO2 emissions 
play? {2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.6} To what extent do 1.5°C pathways involve 
overshooting and returning below 1.5°C during the 21st century? {2.2, 
2.3} What are the implications for transitions in energy, land use and 
sustainable development? {2.3, 2.4, 2.5} How do policy frameworks 
affect the ability to limit warming to 1.5°C? {2.3, 2.5} What are the 
associated knowledge gaps? {2.6}
The assessed pathways describe integrated, quantitative 
evolutions of all emissions over the 21st century associated 
with global energy and land use and the world economy. The 
assessment is contingent upon available integrated assessment 
literature and model assumptions, and is complemented by other 
studies with different scope, for example, those focusing on individual 
sectors. In recent years, integrated mitigation studies have improved 
the characterizations of mitigation pathways. However, limitations 
remain, as climate damages, avoided impacts, or societal co-benefits 
of the modelled transformations remain largely unaccounted for, while 
concurrent rapid technological changes, behavioural aspects, and 
uncertainties about input data present continuous challenges. (high 
confidence) {2.1.3, 2.3, 2.5.1, 2.6, Technical Annex 2}
The Chances of Limiting Warming to 1.5°C 
and the Requirements for Urgent Action
Pathways consistent with 1.5°C of warming above pre-industrial 
levels can be identified under a range of assumptions about 
economic growth, technology developments and lifestyles. 
However, lack of global cooperation, lack of governance of the required 
energy and land transformation, and increases in resource-intensive 
consumption are key impediments to achieving 1.5°C pathways. 
Governance challenges have been related to scenarios with high 
inequality and high population growth in the 1.5°C pathway literature. 
{2.3.1, 2.3.2, 2.5}
Under emissions in line with current pledges under the Paris 
Agreement (known as Nationally Determined Contributions, 
or NDCs), global warming is expected to surpass 1.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels, even if these pledges are supplemented 
with very challenging increases in the scale and ambition of 
mitigation after 2030 (high confidence). This increased action 
would need to achieve net zero CO2 emissions in less than 15 years. 
Even if this is achieved, temperatures would only be expected to remain 
below the 1.5°C threshold if the actual geophysical response ends up 
being towards the low end of the currently estimated uncertainty range. 
Transition challenges as well as identified trade-offs can be reduced if 
global emissions peak before 2030 and marked emissions reductions 
compared to today are already achieved by 2030. {2.2, 2.3.5, Cross-
Chapter Box 11 in Chapter 4}
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Limiting warming to 1.5°C depends on greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions over the next decades, where lower GHG emissions in 
2030 lead to a higher chance of keeping peak warming to 1.5°C 
(high confidence). Available pathways that aim for no or limited (less 
than 0.1°C) overshoot of 1.5°C keep GHG emissions in 2030 to 25–30 
GtCO2e yr−1 in 2030 (interquartile range). This contrasts with median 
estimates for current unconditional NDCs of 52–58 GtCO2e yr
−1 in 
2030. Pathways that aim for limiting warming to 1.5°C by 2100 after 
a temporary temperature overshoot rely on large-scale deployment 
of carbon dioxide removal (CDR) measures, which are uncertain and 
entail clear risks. In model pathways with no or limited overshoot of 
1.5°C, global net anthropogenic CO2 emissions decline by about 45% 
from 2010 levels by 2030 (40–60% interquartile range), reaching net 
zero around 2050 (2045–2055 interquartile range). For limiting global 
warming to below 2°C with at least 66% probability CO2 emissions 
are projected to decline by about 25% by 2030 in most pathways (10–
30% interquartile range) and reach net zero around 2070 (2065–2080 
interquartile range).1 {2.2, 2.3.3, 2.3.5, 2.5.3, Cross-Chapter Boxes 6 in 
Chapter 3 and 9 in Chapter 4, 4.3.7}
Limiting warming to 1.5°C implies reaching net zero CO2 
emissions globally around 2050 and concurrent deep reductions 
in emissions of non-CO2 forcers, particularly methane (high 
confidence). Such mitigation pathways are characterized by energy-
demand reductions, decarbonization of electricity and other fuels, 
electrification of energy end use, deep reductions in agricultural 
emissions, and some form of CDR with carbon storage on land or 
sequestration in geological reservoirs. Low energy demand and low 
demand for land- and GHG-intensive consumption goods facilitate 
limiting warming to as close as possible to 1.5°C. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.3.5, 
2.5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}.
In comparison to a 2°C limit, the transformations required to limit 
warming to 1.5°C are qualitatively similar but more pronounced 
and rapid over the next decades (high confidence). 1.5°C implies 
very ambitious, internationally cooperative policy environments that 
transform both supply and demand (high confidence). {2.3, 2.4, 2.5}
Policies reflecting a high price on emissions are necessary 
in models to achieve cost-effective 1.5°C pathways (high 
confidence). Other things being equal, modelling studies suggest 
the global average discounted marginal abatement costs for limiting 
warming to 1.5°C being about 3–4 times higher compared to 2°C 
over the 21st century, with large variations across models and socio-
economic and policy assumptions. Carbon pricing can be imposed 
directly or implicitly by regulatory policies. Policy instruments, like 
technology policies or performance standards, can complement explicit 
carbon pricing in specific areas. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 4.4.5}
Limiting warming to 1.5°C requires a marked shift in investment 
patterns (medium confidence). Additional annual average energy-
related investments for the period 2016 to 2050 in pathways limiting 
warming to 1.5°C compared to pathways without new climate policies 
beyond those in place today (i.e., baseline) are estimated to be around 
830 billion USD2010 (range of 150 billion to 1700 billion USD2010 
across six models). Total energy-related investments increase by about 
12% (range of 3% to 24%) in 1.5°C pathways relative to 2°C pathways. 
Average annual investment in low-carbon energy technologies and 
energy efficiency are upscaled by roughly a factor of six (range of factor 
of 4 to 10) by 2050 compared to 2015, overtaking fossil investments 
globally by around 2025 (medium confidence). Uncertainties and 
strategic mitigation portfolio choices affect the magnitude and focus 
of required investments. {2.5.2}
Future Emissions in 1.5°C Pathways 
Mitigation requirements can be quantified using carbon budget 
approaches that relate cumulative CO2 emissions to global mean 
temperature increase. Robust physical understanding underpins 
this relationship, but uncertainties become increasingly relevant as a 
specific temperature limit is approached. These uncertainties relate to 
the transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE), 
non-CO2 emissions, radiative forcing and response, potential additional 
Earth system feedbacks (such as permafrost thawing), and historical 
emissions and temperature. {2.2.2, 2.6.1} 
Cumulative CO2 emissions are kept within a budget by reducing 
global annual CO2 emissions to net zero. This assessment 
suggests a remaining budget of about 420 GtCO2 for a two-
thirds chance of limiting warming to 1.5°C, and of about 580 
GtCO2 for an even chance (medium confidence). The remaining 
carbon budget is defined here as cumulative CO2 emissions from the 
start of 2018 until the time of net zero global emissions for global 
warming defined as a change in global near-surface air temperatures. 
Remaining budgets applicable to 2100 would be approximately 
100 GtCO2 lower than this to account for permafrost thawing and 
potential methane release from wetlands in the future, and more 
thereafter. These estimates come with an additional geophysical 
uncertainty of at least ±400 GtCO2, related to non-CO2 response 
and TCRE distribution. Uncertainties in the level of historic warming 
contribute ±250 GtCO2. In addition, these estimates can vary by 
±250 GtCO2 depending on non-CO2 mitigation strategies as found in 
available pathways. {2.2.2, 2.6.1}
Staying within a remaining carbon budget of 580 GtCO2 implies 
that CO2 emissions reach carbon neutrality in about 30 years, 
reduced to 20 years for a 420 GtCO2 remaining carbon budget 
(high confidence). The ±400 GtCO2 geophysical uncertainty range 
surrounding a carbon budget translates into a variation of this timing 
of carbon neutrality of roughly ±15–20 years. If emissions do not start 
declining in the next decade, the point of carbon neutrality would need 
to be reached at least two decades earlier to remain within the same 
carbon budget. {2.2.2, 2.3.5}
Non-CO2 emissions contribute to peak warming and thus 
affect the remaining carbon budget. The evolution of 
methane and sulphur dioxide emissions strongly influences 
the chances of limiting warming to 1.5°C. In the near-term, a 
1 Kyoto-GHG emissions in this statement are aggregated with GWP-100 values of the IPCC Second Assessment Report.
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weakening of aerosol cooling would add to future warming, 
but can be tempered by reductions in methane emissions (high 
confidence). Uncertainty in radiative forcing estimates (particularly 
aerosol) affects carbon budgets and the certainty of pathway 
categorizations. Some non-CO2 forcers are emitted alongside CO2, 
particularly in the energy and transport sectors, and can be largely 
addressed through CO2 mitigation. Others require specific measures, 
for example, to target agricultural nitrous oxide (N2O) and methane 
(CH4), some sources of black carbon, or hydrofluorocarbons (high 
confidence). In many cases, non-CO2 emissions reductions are similar 
in 2°C pathways, indicating reductions near their assumed maximum 
potential by integrated assessment models. Emissions of N2O and 
NH3 increase in some pathways with strongly increased bioenergy 
demand. {2.2.2, 2.3.1, 2.4.2, 2.5.3}
The Role of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) 
All analysed pathways limiting warming to 1.5°C with no 
or limited overshoot use CDR to some extent to neutralize 
emissions from sources for which no mitigation measures 
have been identified and, in most cases, also to achieve 
net negative emissions to return global warming to 1.5°C 
following a peak (high confidence). The longer the delay in 
reducing CO2 emissions towards zero, the larger the likelihood 
of exceeding 1.5°C, and the heavier the implied reliance on 
net negative emissions after mid-century to return warming to 
1.5°C (high confidence). The faster reduction of net CO2 emissions 
in 1.5°C compared to 2°C pathways is predominantly achieved by 
measures that result in less CO2 being produced and emitted, and 
only to a smaller degree through additional CDR. Limitations on 
the speed, scale and societal acceptability of CDR deployment also 
limit the conceivable extent of temperature overshoot. Limits to our 
understanding of how the carbon cycle responds to net negative 
emissions increase the uncertainty about the effectiveness of CDR to 
decline temperatures after a peak. {2.2, 2.3, 2.6, 4.3.7}
CDR deployed at scale is unproven, and reliance on such 
technology is a major risk in the ability to limit warming to 
1.5°C. CDR is needed less in pathways with particularly strong 
emphasis on energy efficiency and low demand. The scale and 
type of CDR deployment varies widely across 1.5°C pathways, 
with different consequences for achieving sustainable 
development objectives (high confidence). Some pathways rely 
more on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), while 
others rely more on afforestation, which are the two CDR methods 
most often included in integrated pathways. Trade-offs with other 
sustainability objectives occur predominantly through increased land, 
energy, water and investment demand. Bioenergy use is substantial 
in 1.5°C pathways with or without BECCS due to its multiple roles in 
decarbonizing energy use. {2.3.1, 2.5.3, 2.6.3, 4.3.7}
Properties of Energy and Land Transitions in 1.5°C Pathways 
The share of primary energy from renewables increases while 
coal usage decreases across pathways limiting warming to 
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot (high confidence). By 2050, 
renewables (including bioenergy, hydro, wind, and solar, with direct-
equivalence method) supply a share of 52–67% (interquartile range) 
of primary energy in 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot; 
while the share from coal decreases to 1–7% (interquartile range), 
with a large fraction of this coal use combined with carbon capture 
and storage (CCS). From 2020 to 2050 the primary energy supplied 
by oil declines in most pathways (−39 to −77% interquartile range). 
Natural gas changes by −13% to −62% (interquartile range), but 
some pathways show a marked increase albeit with widespread 
deployment of CCS. The overall deployment of CCS varies widely 
across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot, with cumulative 
CO2 stored through 2050 ranging from zero up to 300 GtCO2 
(minimum–maximum range), of which zero up to 140 GtCO2 is stored 
from biomass. Primary energy supplied by bioenergy ranges from 
40–310 EJ yr−1 in 2050 (minimum-maximum range), and nuclear from 
3–66 EJ yr−1 (minimum–maximum range). These ranges reflect both 
uncertainties in technological development and strategic mitigation 
portfolio choices. {2.4.2}
1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot include a rapid 
decline in the carbon intensity of electricity and an increase 
in electrification of energy end use (high confidence). By 2050, 
the carbon intensity of electricity decreases to −92 to +11 gCO2 MJ
−1 
(minimum–maximum range) from about 140 gCO2 MJ
−1 in 2020, 
and electricity covers 34–71% (minimum–maximum range) of final 
energy across 1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot from 
about 20% in 2020. By 2050, the share of electricity supplied by 
renewables increases to 59–97% (minimum-maximum range) across 
1.5°C pathways with no or limited overshoot. Pathways with higher 
chances of holding warming to below 1.5°C generally show a faster 
decline in the carbon intensity of electricity by 2030 than pathways 
that temporarily overshoot 1.5°C. {2.4.1, 2.4.2, 2.4.3}
Transitions in global and regional land use are found in all 
pathways limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited 
overshoot, but their scale depends on the pursued mitigation 
portfolio (high confidence). Pathways that limit global warming to 
1.5°C with no or limited overshoot project a 4 million km2 reduction 
to a 2.5 million km2 increase of non-pasture agricultural land for food 
and feed crops and a 0.5–11 million km2 reduction of pasture land, 
to be converted into 0-6 million km2 of agricultural land for energy 
crops and a 2 million km2 reduction to 9.5 million km2 increase in 
forests by 2050 relative to 2010 (medium confidence). Land-use 
transitions of similar magnitude can be observed in modelled 2°C 
pathways (medium confidence). Such large transitions pose profound 
challenges for sustainable management of the various demands on 
land for human settlements, food, livestock feed, fibre, bioenergy, 
carbon storage, biodiversity and other ecosystem services (high 
confidence). {2.3.4, 2.4.4}
Demand-Side Mitigation and Behavioural Changes 
Demand-side measures are key elements of 1.5°C pathways. 
Lifestyle choices lowering energy demand and the land- and 
GHG-intensity of food consumption can further support 
achievement of 1.5°C pathways (high confidence). By 2030 and 
2050, all end-use sectors (including building, transport, and industry) 
show marked energy demand reductions in modelled 1.5°C pathways, 
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comparable and beyond those projected in 2°C pathways. Sectoral 
models support the scale of these reductions. {2.3.4, 2.4.3, 2.5.1}
Links between 1.5°C Pathways and Sustainable Development 
Choices about mitigation portfolios for limiting warming to 
1.5°C can positively or negatively impact the achievement of 
other societal objectives, such as sustainable development 
(high confidence). In particular, demand-side and efficiency 
measures, and lifestyle choices that limit energy, resource, and 
GHG-intensive food demand support sustainable development 
(medium confidence). Limiting warming to 1.5°C can be achieved 
synergistically with poverty alleviation and improved energy security 
and can provide large public health benefits through improved air 
quality, preventing millions of premature deaths. However, specific 
mitigation measures, such as bioenergy, may result in trade-offs that 
require consideration. {2.5.1, 2.5.2, 2.5.3}
TS.3 Impacts of 1.5ºC Global Warming 
on Natural and Human Systems
This chapter builds on findings of AR5 and assesses new scientific 
evidence of changes in the climate system and the associated impacts 
on natural and human systems, with a specific focus on the magnitude 
and pattern of risks linked for global warming of 1.5°C above 
temperatures in the pre-industrial period. Chapter 3 explores observed 
impacts and projected risks to a range of natural and human systems, 
with a focus on how risk levels change from 1.5°C to 2°C of global 
warming. The chapter also revisits major categories of risk (Reasons for 
Concern, RFC) based on the assessment of new knowledge that has 
become available since AR5. 
1.5°C and 2°C Warmer Worlds
The global climate has changed relative to the pre-industrial 
period, and there are multiple lines of evidence that these 
changes have had impacts on organisms and ecosystems, as 
well as on human systems and well-being (high confidence). The 
increase in global mean surface temperature (GMST), which reached 
0.87°C in 2006–2015 relative to 1850–1900, has increased the 
frequency and magnitude of impacts (high confidence), strengthening 
evidence of how an increase in GMST of 1.5°C or more could impact 
natural and human systems (1.5°C versus 2°C). {3.3, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 
Cross-Chapter Boxes 6, 7 and 8 in this chapter}
Human-induced global warming has already caused multiple 
observed changes in the climate system (high confidence). 
Changes include increases in both land and ocean temperatures, as well 
as more frequent heatwaves in most land regions (high confidence). 
There is also high confidence that global warming has resulted in an 
increase in the frequency and duration of marine heatwaves. Further, 
there is substantial evidence that human-induced global warming has 
led to an increase in the frequency, intensity and/or amount of heavy 
precipitation events at the global scale (medium confidence), as well 
as an increased risk of drought in the Mediterranean region (medium 
confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.4}
Trends in intensity and frequency of some climate and weather 
extremes have been detected over time spans during which 
about 0.5°C of global warming occurred (medium confidence). 
This assessment is based on several lines of evidence, including 
attribution studies for changes in extremes since 1950. {3.2, 3.3.1, 
3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4}
Several regional changes in climate are assessed to occur with 
global warming up to 1.5°C as compared to pre-industrial 
levels, including warming of extreme temperatures in many 
regions (high confidence), increases in frequency, intensity and/or 
amount of heavy precipitation in several regions (high confidence), 
and an increase in intensity or frequency of droughts in some regions 
(medium confidence). {3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3, 3.3.4, Table 3.2}
There is no single ‘1.5°C warmer world’ (high confidence). In 
addition to the overall increase in GMST, it is important to consider the 
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size and duration of potential overshoots in temperature. Furthermore, 
there are questions on how the stabilization of an increase in GMST of 
1.5°C can be achieved, and how policies might be able to influence the 
resilience of human and natural systems, and the nature of regional 
and subregional risks. Overshooting poses large risks for natural and 
human systems, especially if the temperature at peak warming is 
high, because some risks may be long-lasting and irreversible, such 
as the loss of some ecosystems (high confidence). The rate of change 
for several types of risks may also have relevance, with potentially 
large risks in the case of a rapid rise to overshooting temperatures, 
even if a decrease to 1.5°C can be achieved at the end of the 21st 
century or later (medium confidence). If overshoot is to be minimized, 
the remaining equivalent CO2 budget available for emissions is very 
small, which implies that large, immediate and unprecedented global 
efforts to mitigate greenhouse gases are required (high confidence). 
{3.2, 3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}
Robust1 global differences in temperature means and extremes 
are expected if global warming reaches 1.5°C versus 2°C above 
the pre-industrial levels (high confidence). For oceans, regional 
surface temperature means and extremes are projected to be higher 
at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (high confidence). 
Temperature means and extremes are also projected to be higher at 
2°C compared to 1.5°C in most land regions, with increases being 
2–3 times greater than the increase in GMST projected for some 
regions (high confidence). Robust increases in temperature means and 
extremes are also projected at 1.5°C compared to present-day values 
(high confidence) {3.3.1, 3.3.2}. There are decreases in the occurrence 
of cold extremes, but substantial increases in their temperature, in 
particular in regions with snow or ice cover (high confidence) {3.3.1}.
Climate models project robust2 differences in regional climate 
between present-day and global warming up to 1.5°C3, and 
between 1.5°C and 2°C3 (high confidence), depending on the 
variable and region in question (high confidence). Large, robust 
and widespread differences are expected for temperature 
extremes (high confidence). Regarding hot extremes, the strongest 
warming is expected to occur at mid-latitudes in the warm season (with 
increases of up to 3°C for 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of two) 
and at high latitudes in the cold season (with increases of up to 4.5°C 
at 1.5°C of global warming, i.e., a factor of three) (high confidence). 
The strongest warming of hot extremes is projected to occur in 
central and eastern North America, central and southern Europe, the 
Mediterranean region (including southern Europe, northern Africa and 
the Near East), western and central Asia, and southern Africa (medium 
confidence). The number of exceptionally hot days are expected to 
increase the most in the tropics, where interannual temperature 
variability is lowest; extreme heatwaves are thus projected to emerge 
earliest in these regions, and they are expected to already become 
widespread there at 1.5°C global warming (high confidence). Limiting 
global warming to 1.5°C instead of 2°C could result in around 420 
million fewer people being frequently exposed to extreme heatwaves, 
and about 65 million fewer people being exposed to exceptional 
heatwaves, assuming constant vulnerability (medium confidence). 
{3.3.1, 3.3.2, Cross-Chapter Box 8 in this chapter}
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C would limit risks of increases 
in heavy precipitation events on a global scale and in several 
regions compared to conditions at 2°C global warming 
(medium confidence). The regions with the largest increases in heavy 
precipitation events for 1.5°C to 2°C global warming include: several 
high-latitude regions (e.g. Alaska/western Canada, eastern Canada/
Greenland/Iceland, northern Europe and northern Asia); mountainous 
regions (e.g., Tibetan Plateau); eastern Asia (including China and Japan); 
and eastern North America (medium confidence). Tropical cyclones are 
projected to decrease in frequency but with an increase in the number 
of very intense cyclones (limited evidence, low confidence). Heavy 
precipitation associated with tropical cyclones is projected to be higher 
at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global warming (medium confidence). 
Heavy precipitation, when aggregated at a global scale, is projected to 
be higher at 2°C than at 1.5°C of global warming (medium confidence) 
{3.3.3, 3.3.6}
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C is expected to substantially 
reduce the probability of extreme drought, precipitation deficits, 
and risks associated with water availability (i.e., water stress) in 
some regions (medium confidence). In particular, risks associated 
with increases in drought frequency and magnitude are projected to be 
substantially larger at 2°C than at 1.5°C in the Mediterranean region 
(including southern Europe, northern Africa and the Near East) and 
southern Africa (medium confidence). {3.3.3, 3.3.4, Box 3.1, Box 3.2} 
Risks to natural and human systems are expected to be lower 
at 1.5°C than at 2°C of global warming (high confidence). This 
difference is due to the smaller rates and magnitudes of climate 
change associated with a 1.5°C temperature increase, including lower 
frequencies and intensities of temperature-related extremes. Lower 
rates of change enhance the ability of natural and human systems 
to adapt, with substantial benefits for a wide range of terrestrial, 
freshwater, wetland, coastal and ocean ecosystems (including coral 
reefs) (high confidence), as well as food production systems, human 
health, and tourism (medium confidence), together with energy 
systems and transportation (low confidence). {3.3.1, 3.4}
Exposure to multiple and compound climate-related risks is 
projected to increase between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming 
with greater proportions of people both exposed and susceptible to 
poverty in Africa and Asia (high confidence). For global warming from 
1.5°C to 2°C, risks across energy, food, and water sectors could overlap 
spatially and temporally, creating new – and exacerbating current – 
hazards, exposures, and vulnerabilities that could affect increasing 
numbers of people and regions (medium confidence). Small island 
states and economically disadvantaged populations are particularly at 
risk (high confidence). {3.3.1, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.6, 3.4.11, 3.5.4.9, Box 3.5}
2 Robust is used here to mean that at least two thirds of climate models show the same sign of changes at the grid point scale, and that differences in large regions are 
statistically significant.
3 Projected changes in impacts between different levels of global warming are determined with respect to changes in global mean near-surface air temperature.
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Global warming of 2°C would lead to an expansion of areas with 
significant increases in runoff, as well as those affected by flood 
hazard, compared to conditions at 1.5°C (medium confidence). 
Global warming of 1.5°C would also lead to an expansion of the global 
land area with significant increases in runoff (medium confidence) and 
an increase in flood hazard in some regions (medium confidence) 
compared to present-day conditions. {3.3.5}
The probability of a sea-ice-free Arctic Ocean4 during summer 
is substantially higher at 2°C compared to 1.5°C of global 
warming (medium confidence). Model simulations suggest that 
at least one sea-ice-free Arctic summer is expected every 10 years 
for global warming of 2°C, with the frequency decreasing to one 
sea-ice-free Arctic summer every 100 years under 1.5°C (medium 
confidence). An intermediate temperature overshoot will have no long-
term consequences for Arctic sea ice coverage, and hysteresis is not 
expected (high confidence). {3.3.8, 3.4.4.7}
Global mean sea level rise (GMSLR) is projected to be around 
0.1 m (0.04 – 0.16 m) less by the end of the 21st century in a 
1.5°C warmer world compared to a 2°C warmer world (medium 
confidence). Projected GMSLR for 1.5°C of global warming has an 
indicative range of 0.26 – 0.77m, relative to 1986–2005, (medium 
confidence). A smaller sea level rise could mean that up to 10.4 million 
fewer people (based on the 2010 global population and assuming no 
adaptation) would be exposed to the impacts of sea level rise globally 
in 2100 at 1.5°C compared to at 2°C. A slower rate of sea level rise 
enables greater opportunities for adaptation (medium confidence). 
There is high confidence that sea level rise will continue beyond 2100. 
Instabilities exist for both the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, which 
could result in multi-meter rises in sea level on time scales of century 
to millennia. There is medium confidence that these instabilities could 
be triggered at around 1.5°C to 2°C of global warming. {3.3.9, 3.4.5, 
3.6.3}
The ocean has absorbed about 30% of the anthropogenic 
carbon dioxide, resulting in ocean acidification and changes to 
carbonate chemistry that are unprecedented for at least the 
last 65 million years (high confidence). Risks have been identified 
for the survival, calcification, growth, development and abundance of 
a broad range of marine taxonomic groups, ranging from algae to fish, 
with substantial evidence of predictable trait-based sensitivities (high 
confidence). There are multiple lines of evidence that ocean warming 
and acidification corresponding to 1.5°C of global warming would 
impact a wide range of marine organisms and ecosystems, as well as 
sectors such as aquaculture and fisheries (high confidence). {3.3.10, 
3.4.4}
Larger risks are expected for many regions and systems for 
global warming at 1.5°C, as compared to today, with adaptation 
required now and up to 1.5°C. However, risks would be larger at 2°C of 
warming and an even greater effort would be needed for adaptation to 
a temperature increase of that magnitude (high confidence). {3.4, Box 
3.4, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}
Future risks at 1.5°C of global warming will depend on the 
mitigation pathway and on the possible occurrence of a 
transient overshoot (high confidence). The impacts on natural 
and human systems would be greater if mitigation pathways 
temporarily overshoot 1.5°C and return to 1.5°C later in the century, 
as compared to pathways that stabilize at 1.5°C without an overshoot 
(high confidence). The size and duration of an overshoot would also 
affect future impacts (e.g., irreversible loss of some ecosystems) (high 
confidence). Changes in land use resulting from mitigation choices 
could have impacts on food production and ecosystem diversity. {3.6.1, 
3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}
Climate Change Risks for Natural and Human systems 
Terrestrial and Wetland Ecosystems
Risks of local species losses and, consequently, risks of 
extinction are much less in a 1.5°C versus a 2°C warmer world 
(high confidence). The number of species projected to lose over 
half of their climatically determined geographic range at 2°C global 
warming (18% of insects, 16% of plants, 8% of vertebrates) is 
projected to be reduced to 6% of insects, 8% of plants and 4% of 
vertebrates at 1.5°C warming (medium confidence). Risks associated 
with other biodiversity-related factors, such as forest fires, extreme 
weather events, and the spread of invasive species, pests and 
diseases, would also be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C of warming (high 
confidence), supporting a greater persistence of ecosystem services. 
{3.4.3, 3.5.2}
Constraining global warming to 1.5°C, rather than to 2°C 
and higher, is projected to have many benefits for terrestrial 
and wetland ecosystems and for the preservation of their 
services to humans (high confidence). Risks for natural and 
managed ecosystems are higher on drylands compared to humid 
lands. The global terrestrial land area projected to be affected by 
ecosystem transformations (13%, interquartile range 8–20%) at 2°C 
is approximately halved at 1.5°C global warming to 4% (interquartile 
range 2–7%) (medium confidence). Above 1.5°C, an expansion of 
desert terrain and vegetation would occur in the Mediterranean 
biome (medium confidence), causing changes unparalleled in the last 
10,000 years (medium confidence). {3.3.2.2, 3.4.3.2, 3.4.3.5, 3.4.6.1, 
3.5.5.10, Box 4.2}
Many impacts are projected to be larger at higher latitudes, 
owing to mean and cold-season warming rates above the 
global average (medium confidence). High-latitude tundra and 
boreal forest are particularly at risk, and woody shrubs are already 
encroaching into tundra (high confidence) and will proceed with 
further warming. Constraining warming to 1.5°C would prevent the 
thawing of an estimated permafrost area of 1.5 to 2.5 million km2 
over centuries compared to thawing under 2°C (medium confidence). 
{3.3.2, 3.4.3, 3.4.4}
4 Ice free is defined for the Special Report as when the sea ice extent is less than 106 km2. Ice coverage less than this is considered to be equivalent to an ice-free Arctic Ocean 
for practical purposes in all recent studies. 
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Ocean Ecosystems
Ocean ecosystems are already experiencing large-scale 
changes, and critical thresholds are expected to be reached at 
1.5°C and higher levels of global warming (high confidence). 
In the transition to 1.5°C of warming, changes to water temperatures 
are expected to drive some species (e.g., plankton, fish) to relocate 
to higher latitudes and cause novel ecosystems to assemble (high 
confidence). Other ecosystems (e.g., kelp forests, coral reefs) are 
relatively less able to move, however, and are projected to experience 
high rates of mortality and loss (very high confidence). For example, 
multiple lines of evidence indicate that the majority (70–90%) of 
warm water (tropical) coral reefs that exist today will disappear even 
if global warming is constrained to 1.5°C (very high confidence). 
{3.4.4, Box 3.4}
Current ecosystem services from the ocean are expected to be 
reduced at 1.5°C of global warming, with losses being even 
greater at 2°C of global warming (high confidence). The risks 
of declining ocean productivity, shifts of species to higher latitudes, 
damage to ecosystems (e.g., coral reefs, and mangroves, seagrass 
and other wetland ecosystems), loss of fisheries productivity (at 
low latitudes), and changes to ocean chemistry (e.g., acidification, 
hypoxia and dead zones) are projected to be substantially lower 
when global warming is limited to 1.5°C (high confidence). {3.4.4, 
Box 3.4}
Water Resources
The projected frequency and magnitude of floods and droughts 
in some regions are smaller under 1.5°C than under 2°C of 
warming (medium confidence). Human exposure to increased 
flooding is projected to be substantially lower at 1.5°C compared to 
2°C of global warming, although projected changes create regionally 
differentiated risks (medium confidence). The differences in the risks 
among regions are strongly influenced by local socio-economic 
conditions (medium confidence). {3.3.4, 3.3.5, 3.4.2}
Risks of water scarcity are projected to be greater at 2°C than at 
1.5°C of global warming in some regions (medium confidence). 
Depending on future socio-economic conditions, limiting global 
warming to 1.5°C, compared to 2°C, may reduce the proportion of 
the world population exposed to a climate change-induced increase 
in water stress by up to 50%, although there is considerable variability 
between regions (medium confidence). Regions with particularly 
large benefits could include the Mediterranean and the Caribbean 
(medium confidence). Socio-economic drivers, however, are expected 
to have a greater influence on these risks than the changes in climate 
(medium confidence). {3.3.5, 3.4.2, Box 3.5}
Land Use, Food Security and Food Production Systems
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C, compared with 2°C, is 
projected to result in smaller net reductions in yields of maize, 
rice, wheat, and potentially other cereal crops, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Central and South America; 
and in the CO2-dependent nutritional quality of rice and wheat 
(high confidence). A loss of 7–10% of rangeland livestock globally 
is projected for approximately 2°C of warming, with considerable 
economic consequences for many communities and regions (medium 
confidence). {3.4.6, 3.6, Box 3.1, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}
Reductions in projected food availability are larger at 2°C 
than at 1.5°C of global warming in the Sahel, southern Africa, 
the Mediterranean, central Europe and the Amazon (medium 
confidence). This suggests a transition from medium to high risk of 
regionally differentiated impacts on food security between 1.5°C and 
2°C (medium confidence). Future economic and trade environments 
and their response to changing food availability (medium confidence) 
are important potential adaptation options for reducing hunger risk 
in low- and middle-income countries. {Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this 
chapter}
Fisheries and aquaculture are important to global food security 
but are already facing increasing risks from ocean warming 
and acidification (medium confidence). These risks are 
projected to increase at 1.5°C of global warming and impact 
key organisms such as fin fish and bivalves (e.g., oysters), 
especially at low latitudes (medium confidence). Small-scale 
fisheries in tropical regions, which are very dependent on habitat 
provided by coastal ecosystems such as coral reefs, mangroves, 
seagrass and kelp forests, are expected to face growing risks at 1.5°C 
of warming because of loss of habitat (medium confidence). Risks 
of impacts and decreasing food security are projected to become 
greater as global warming reaches beyond 1.5°C and both ocean 
warming and acidification increase, with substantial losses likely for 
coastal livelihoods and industries (e.g., fisheries and aquaculture) 
(medium to high confidence). {3.4.4, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, Box 3.1, Box 3.4, 
Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 6 in this chapter}
Land use and land-use change emerge as critical features of 
virtually all mitigation pathways that seek to limit global 
warming to 1.5°C (high confidence). Most least-cost mitigation 
pathways to limit peak or end-of-century warming to 1.5°C make 
use of carbon dioxide removal (CDR), predominantly employing 
significant levels of bioenergy with carbon capture and storage 
(BECCS) and/or afforestation and reforestation (AR) in their portfolio 
of mitigation measures (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in 
this chapter}
Large-scale deployment of BECCS and/or AR would have 
a far-reaching land and water footprint (high confidence). 
Whether this footprint would result in adverse impacts, for example 
on biodiversity or food production, depends on the existence and 
effectiveness of measures to conserve land carbon stocks, measures 
to limit agricultural expansion in order to protect natural ecosystems, 
and the potential to increase agricultural productivity (medium 
agreement). In addition, BECCS and/or AR would have substantial 
direct effects on regional climate through biophysical feedbacks, 
which are generally not included in Integrated Assessments Models 
(high confidence). {3.6.2, Cross-Chapter Boxes 7 and 8 in this chapter}
The impacts of large-scale CDR deployment could be greatly 
reduced if a wider portfolio of CDR options were deployed, if a 
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holistic policy for sustainable land management were adopted, 
and if increased mitigation efforts were employed to strongly 
limit the demand for land, energy and material resources, 
including through lifestyle and dietary changes (medium 
confidence). In particular, reforestation could be associated with 
significant co-benefits if implemented in a manner than helps restore 
natural ecosystems (high confidence). {Cross-Chapter Box 7 in this 
chapter}
Human Health, Well-Being, Cities and Poverty
Any increase in global temperature (e.g., +0.5°C) is projected 
to affect human health, with primarily negative consequences 
(high confidence). Lower risks are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C 
for heat-related morbidity and mortality (very high confidence), and 
for ozone-related mortality if emissions needed for ozone formation 
remain high (high confidence). Urban heat islands often amplify the 
impacts of heatwaves in cities (high confidence). Risks for some 
vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever are projected 
to increase with warming from 1.5°C to 2°C, including potential 
shifts in their geographic range (high confidence). Overall for vector-
borne diseases, whether projections are positive or negative depends 
on the disease, region and extent of change (high confidence). Lower 
risks of undernutrition are projected at 1.5°C than at 2°C (medium 
confidence). Incorporating estimates of adaptation into projections 
reduces the magnitude of risks (high confidence). {3.4.7, 3.4.7.1, 
3.4.8, 3.5.5.8} 
Global warming of 2°C is expected to pose greater risks to urban 
areas than global warming of 1.5°C (medium confidence). The 
extent of risk depends on human vulnerability and the effectiveness 
of adaptation for regions (coastal and non-coastal), informal 
settlements and infrastructure sectors (such as energy, water and 
transport) (high confidence). {3.4.5, 3.4.8}
Poverty and disadvantage have increased with recent warming 
(about 1°C) and are expected to increase for many populations 
as average global temperatures increase from 1°C to 1.5°C 
and higher (medium confidence). Outmigration in agricultural-
dependent communities is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with global temperature (medium confidence). Our 
understanding of the links of 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming to 
human migration are limited and represent an important knowledge 
gap. {3.4.10, 3.4.11, 5.2.2, Table 3.5}
Key Economic Sectors and Services
Risks to global aggregated economic growth due to climate 
change impacts are projected to be lower at 1.5°C than at 2°C 
by the end of this century (medium confidence). {3.5.2, 3.5.3} 
The largest reductions in economic growth at 2°C compared 
to 1.5°C of warming are projected for low- and middle-income 
countries and regions (the African continent, Southeast Asia, 
India, Brazil and Mexico) (low to medium confidence). Countries 
in the tropics and Southern Hemisphere subtropics are projected to 
experience the largest impacts on economic growth due to climate 
change should global warming increase from 1.5°C to 2°C (medium 
confidence). {3.5}
Global warming has already affected tourism, with increased 
risks projected under 1.5°C of warming in specific geographic 
regions and for seasonal tourism including sun, beach and 
snow sports destinations (very high confidence). Risks will be 
lower for tourism markets that are less climate sensitive, such as 
gaming and large hotel-based activities (high confidence). Risks for 
coastal tourism, particularly in subtropical and tropical regions, will 
increase with temperature-related degradation (e.g., heat extremes, 
storms) or loss of beach and coral reef assets (high confidence). 
{3.3.6, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.9.1, Box 3.4}
Small Islands, and Coastal and Low-lying areas
Small islands are projected to experience multiple inter-
related risks at 1.5°C of global warming that will increase with 
warming of 2°C and higher levels (high confidence). Climate 
hazards at 1.5°C are projected to be lower compared to those at 2°C 
(high confidence). Long-term risks of coastal flooding and impacts on 
populations, infrastructures and assets (high confidence), freshwater 
stress (medium confidence), and risks across marine ecosystems (high 
confidence) and critical sectors (medium confidence) are projected to 
increase at 1.5°C compared to present-day levels and increase further 
at 2°C, limiting adaptation opportunities and increasing loss and 
damage (medium confidence). Migration in small islands (internally 
and internationally) occurs for multiple reasons and purposes, mostly 
for better livelihood opportunities (high confidence) and increasingly 
owing to sea level rise (medium confidence). {3.3.2.2, 3.3.6–9, 
3.4.3.2, 3.4.4.2, 3.4.4.5, 3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.3, 3.4.7.1, 3.4.9.1, 3.5.4.9, 
Box 3.4, Box 3.5}
Impacts associated with sea level rise and changes to the 
salinity of coastal groundwater, increased flooding and damage 
to infrastructure, are projected to be critically important in 
vulnerable environments, such as small islands, low-lying 
coasts and deltas, at global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C (high 
confidence). Localized subsidence and changes to river discharge can 
potentially exacerbate these effects. Adaptation is already happening 
(high confidence) and will remain important over multi-centennial 
time scales. {3.4.5.3, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7, 5.4.5.4, Box 3.5}
Existing and restored natural coastal ecosystems may be 
effective in reducing the adverse impacts of rising sea levels 
and intensifying storms by protecting coastal and deltaic 
regions (medium confidence). Natural sedimentation rates are 
expected to be able to offset the effect of rising sea levels, given 
the slower rates of sea level rise associated with 1.5°C of warming 
(medium confidence). Other feedbacks, such as landward migration 
of wetlands and the adaptation of infrastructure, remain important 
(medium confidence). {3.4.4.12, 3.4.5.4, 3.4.5.7}
Increased Reasons for Concern 
There are multiple lines of evidence that since AR5 the assessed 
levels of risk increased for four of the five Reasons for Concern 
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(RFCs) for global warming levels of up to 2°C (high confidence). 
The risk transitions by degrees of global warming are now: from high 
to very high between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC1 (Unique and threatened 
systems) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 
1.5°C for RFC2 (Extreme weather events) (medium confidence); from 
moderate to high risk between 1.5°C and 2°C for RFC3 (Distribution of 
impacts) (high confidence); from moderate to high risk between 1.5°C 
and 2.5°C for RFC4 (Global aggregate impacts) (medium confidence); 
and from moderate to high risk between 1°C and 2.5°C for RFC5 
(Large-scale singular events) (medium confidence). {3.5.2}
1. The category ‘Unique and threatened systems’ (RFC1) 
display a transition from high to very high risk which is 
now located between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming as 
opposed to at 2.6°C of global warming in AR5, owing to new and 
multiple lines of evidence for changing risks for coral reefs, the 
Arctic and biodiversity in general (high confidence). {3.5.2.1}
2. In ‘Extreme weather events’ (RFC2), the transition from 
moderate to high risk is now located between 1.0°C and 
1.5°C of global warming, which is very similar to the AR5 
assessment but is projected with greater confidence (medium 
confidence). The impact literature contains little information 
about the potential for human society to adapt to extreme 
weather events, and hence it has not been possible to locate 
the transition from ‘high’ to ‘very high’ risk within the context of 
assessing impacts at 1.5°C versus 2°C of global warming. There 
is thus low confidence in the level at which global warming could 
lead to very high risks associated with extreme weather events in 
the context of this report. {3.5} 
3. With respect to the ‘Distribution of impacts’ (RFC3) a 
transition from moderate to high risk is now located 
between 1.5°C and 2°C of global warming, compared with 
between 1.6°C and 2.6°C global warming in AR5, owing to new 
evidence about regionally differentiated risks to food security, 
water resources, drought, heat exposure and coastal submergence 
(high confidence). {3.5}
4. In ‘global aggregate impacts’ (RFC4) a transition from 
moderate to high levels of risk is now located between 
1.5°C and 2.5°C of global warming, as opposed to at 3.6°C of 
warming in AR5, owing to new evidence about global aggregate 
economic impacts and risks to Earth’s biodiversity (medium 
confidence). {3.5}
5. Finally, ‘large-scale singular events’ (RFC5), moderate risk 
is now located at 1°C of global warming and high risk is 
located at 2.5°C of global warming, as opposed to at 1.6°C 
(moderate risk) and around 4°C (high risk) in AR5, because of new 
observations and models of the West Antarctic ice sheet (medium 
confidence). {3.3.9, 3.5.2, 3.6.3}
TS.4 Strengthening and Implementing 
the Global Response
Limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels would 
require transformative systemic change, integrated with 
sustainable development. Such change would require the 
upscaling and acceleration of the implementation of far-
reaching, multilevel and cross-sectoral climate mitigation 
and addressing barriers. Such systemic change would need 
to be linked to complementary adaptation actions, including 
transformational adaptation, especially for pathways that 
temporarily overshoot 1.5°C (medium evidence, high agreement) 
{Chapter 2, Chapter 3, 4.2.1, 4.4.5, 4.5}. Current national pledges 
on mitigation and adaptation are not enough to stay below the Paris 
Agreement temperature limits and achieve its adaptation goals. While 
transitions in energy efficiency, carbon intensity of fuels, electrification 
and land-use change are underway in various countries, limiting 
warming to 1.5°C will require a greater scale and pace of change to 
transform energy, land, urban and industrial systems globally. {4.3, 4.4, 
Cross-Chapter Box 9 in this Chapter} 
Although multiple communities around the world are 
demonstrating the possibility of implementation consistent with 
1.5°C pathways {Boxes 4.1-4.10}, very few countries, regions, 
cities, communities or businesses can currently make such 
a claim (high confidence). To strengthen the global response, 
almost all countries would need to significantly raise their level 
of ambition. Implementation of this raised ambition would 
require enhanced institutional capabilities in all countries, 
including building the capability to utilize indigenous and 
local knowledge (medium evidence, high agreement). In developing 
countries and for poor and vulnerable people, implementing the 
response would require financial, technological and other forms of 
support to build capacity, for which additional local, national and 
international resources would need to be mobilized (high confidence). 
However, public, financial, institutional and innovation capabilities 
currently fall short of implementing far-reaching measures at scale in 
all countries (high confidence). Transnational networks that support 
multilevel climate action are growing, but challenges in their scale-up 
remain. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.4, 4.4.5, Box 4.1, Box 4.2, Box 4.7}
Adaptation needs will be lower in a 1.5°C world compared to 
a 2°C world (high confidence) {Chapter 3; Cross-Chapter Box 11 
in this chapter}. Learning from current adaptation practices and 
strengthening them through adaptive governance {4.4.1}, lifestyle 
and behavioural change {4.4.3} and innovative financing mechanisms 
{4.4.5} can help their mainstreaming within sustainable development 
practices. Preventing maladaptation, drawing on bottom-up approaches 
{Box 4.6} and using indigenous knowledge {Box 4.3} would effectively 
engage and protect vulnerable people and communities. While 
adaptation finance has increased quantitatively, significant further 
expansion would be needed to adapt to 1.5°C. Qualitative gaps in the 
distribution of adaptation finance, readiness to absorb resources, and 
monitoring mechanisms undermine the potential of adaptation finance 
to reduce impacts. {Chapter 3, 4.4.2, 4.4.5, 4.6}
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System Transitions
The energy system transition that would be required to limit 
global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial conditions is 
underway in many sectors and regions around the world 
(medium evidence, high agreement). The political, economic, social 
and technical feasibility of solar energy, wind energy and electricity 
storage technologies has improved dramatically over the past few 
years, while that of nuclear energy and carbon dioxide capture 
and storage (CCS) in the electricity sector have not shown similar 
improvements. {4.3.1}
Electrification, hydrogen, bio-based feedstocks and substitution, 
and, in several cases, carbon dioxide capture, utilization and 
storage (CCUS) would lead to the deep emissions reductions 
required in energy-intensive industries to limit warming to 
1.5°C. However, those options are limited by institutional, economic and 
technical constraints, which increase financial risks to many incumbent 
firms (medium evidence, high agreement). Energy efficiency in industry 
is more economically feasible and helps enable industrial system 
transitions but would have to be complemented with greenhouse gas 
(GHG)-neutral processes or carbon dioxide removal (CDR) to make 
energy-intensive industries consistent with 1.5°C (high confidence). 
{4.3.1, 4.3.4}
Global and regional land-use and ecosystems transitions and 
associated changes in behaviour that would be required to 
limit warming to 1.5°C can enhance future adaptation and 
land-based agricultural and forestry mitigation potential. Such 
transitions could, however, carry consequences for livelihoods 
that depend on agriculture and natural resources {4.3.2, Cross-
Chapter Box 6 in Chapter 3}. Alterations of agriculture and forest 
systems to achieve mitigation goals could affect current ecosystems 
and their services and potentially threaten food, water and livelihood 
security. While this could limit the social and environmental feasibility 
of land-based mitigation options, careful design and implementation 
could enhance their acceptability and support sustainable development 
objectives (medium evidence, medium agreement). {4.3.2, 4.5.3}
Changing agricultural practices can be an effective climate 
adaptation strategy. A diversity of adaptation options exists, 
including mixed crop-livestock production systems which can be a 
cost-effective adaptation strategy in many global agriculture systems 
(robust evidence, medium agreement). Improving irrigation efficiency 
could effectively deal with changing global water endowments, 
especially if achieved via farmers adopting new behaviours and water-
efficient practices rather than through large-scale infrastructural 
interventions (medium evidence, medium agreement). Well-designed 
adaptation processes such as community-based adaptation can be 
effective depending upon context and levels of vulnerability. {4.3.2, 
4.5.3}
Improving the efficiency of food production and closing yield 
gaps have the potential to reduce emissions from agriculture, 
reduce pressure on land, and enhance food security and future 
mitigation potential (high confidence). Improving productivity of 
existing agricultural systems generally reduces the emissions intensity 
of food production and offers strong synergies with rural development, 
poverty reduction and food security objectives, but options to reduce 
absolute emissions are limited unless paired with demand-side 
measures. Technological innovation including biotechnology, with 
adequate safeguards, could contribute to resolving current feasibility 
constraints and expand the future mitigation potential of agriculture. 
{4.3.2, 4.4.4}
Shifts in dietary choices towards foods with lower emissions 
and requirements for land, along with reduced food loss and 
waste, could reduce emissions and increase adaptation options 
(high confidence). Decreasing food loss and waste and changing 
dietary behaviour could result in mitigation and adaptation (high 
confidence) by reducing both emissions and pressure on land, with 
significant co-benefits for food security, human health and sustainable 
development {4.3.2, 4.4.5, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 5.4.2}, but evidence of 
successful policies to modify dietary choices remains limited. 
Mitigation and Adaptation Options and Other Measures
A mix of mitigation and adaptation options implemented in a 
participatory and integrated manner can enable rapid, systemic 
transitions – in urban and rural areas – that are necessary 
elements of an accelerated transition consistent with limiting 
warming to 1.5°C. Such options and changes are most effective 
when aligned with economic and sustainable development, 
and when local and regional governments are supported by 
national governments {4.3.3, 4.4.1, 4.4.3}. Various mitigation 
options are expanding rapidly across many geographies. Although 
many have development synergies, not all income groups have so 
far benefited from them. Electrification, end-use energy efficiency 
and increased share of renewables, amongst other options, are 
lowering energy use and decarbonizing energy supply in the built 
environment, especially in buildings. Other rapid changes needed in 
urban environments include demotorization and decarbonization of 
transport, including the expansion of electric vehicles, and greater use 
of energy-efficient appliances (medium evidence, high agreement). 
Technological and social innovations can contribute to limiting 
warming to 1.5°C, for example, by enabling the use of smart grids, 
energy storage technologies and general-purpose technologies, such 
as information and communication technology (ICT) that can be 
deployed to help reduce emissions. Feasible adaptation options include 
green infrastructure, resilient water and urban ecosystem services, 
urban and peri-urban agriculture, and adapting buildings and land use 
through regulation and planning (medium evidence, medium to high 
agreement). {4.3.3, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}
Synergies can be achieved across systemic transitions through 
several overarching adaptation options in rural and urban areas. 
Investments in health, social security and risk sharing and spreading 
are cost-effective adaptation measures with high potential for scaling 
up (medium evidence, medium to high agreement). Disaster risk 
management and education-based adaptation have lower prospects of 
scalability and cost-effectiveness (medium evidence, high agreement) 
but are critical for building adaptive capacity. {4.3.5, 4.5.3}
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Converging adaptation and mitigation options can lead to 
synergies and potentially increase cost-effectiveness, but 
multiple trade-offs can limit the speed of and potential for 
scaling up. Many examples of synergies and trade-offs exist in 
all sectors and system transitions. For instance, sustainable water 
management (high evidence, medium agreement) and investment in 
green infrastructure (medium evidence, high agreement) to deliver 
sustainable water and environmental services and to support urban 
agriculture are less cost-effective than other adaptation options but 
can help build climate resilience. Achieving the governance, finance 
and social support required to enable these synergies and to avoid 
trade-offs is often challenging, especially when addressing multiple 
objectives, and attempting appropriate sequencing and timing of 
interventions. {4.3.2, 4.3.4, 4.4.1, 4.5.2, 4.5.3, 4.5.4}
Though CO2 dominates long-term warming, the reduction of 
warming short-lived climate forcers (SLCFs), such as methane 
and black carbon, can in the short term contribute significantly to 
limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Reductions 
of black carbon and methane would have substantial co-benefits 
(high confidence), including improved health due to reduced air 
pollution. This, in turn, enhances the institutional and socio-
cultural feasibility of such actions. Reductions of several warming 
SLCFs are constrained by economic and social feasibility (low evidence, 
high agreement). As they are often co-emitted with CO2, achieving the 
energy, land and urban transitions necessary to limit warming to 1.5°C 
would see emissions of warming SLCFs greatly reduced. {2.3.3.2, 4.3.6} 
Most CDR options face multiple feasibility constraints, which 
differ between options, limiting the potential for any single 
option to sustainably achieve the large-scale deployment 
required in the 1.5°C-consistent pathways described in 
Chapter 2 (high confidence). Those 1.5°C pathways typically rely 
on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), afforestation 
and reforestation (AR), or both, to neutralize emissions that are 
expensive to avoid, or to draw down CO2 emissions in excess of the 
carbon budget {Chapter 2}. Though BECCS and AR may be technically 
and geophysically feasible, they face partially overlapping yet different 
constraints related to land use. The land footprint per tonne of CO2 
removed is higher for AR than for BECCS, but given the low levels of 
current deployment, the speed and scales required for limiting warming 
to 1.5°C pose a considerable implementation challenge, even if the 
issues of public acceptance and absence of economic incentives were 
to be resolved (high agreement, medium evidence). The large potential 
of afforestation and the co-benefits if implemented appropriately (e.g., 
on biodiversity and soil quality) will diminish over time, as forests 
saturate (high confidence). The energy requirements and economic 
costs of direct air carbon capture and storage (DACCS) and enhanced 
weathering remain high (medium evidence, medium agreement). At the 
local scale, soil carbon sequestration has co-benefits with agriculture 
and is cost-effective even without climate policy (high confidence). Its 
potential feasibility and cost-effectiveness at the global scale appears 
to be more limited. {4.3.7}
Uncertainties surrounding solar radiation modification 
(SRM) measures constrain their potential deployment. These 
uncertainties include: technological immaturity; limited physical 
understanding about their effectiveness to limit global warming; and 
a weak capacity to govern, legitimize, and scale such measures. Some 
recent model-based analysis suggests SRM would be effective but that 
it is too early to evaluate its feasibility. Even in the uncertain case that 
the most adverse side-effects of SRM can be avoided, public resistance, 
ethical concerns and potential impacts on sustainable development 
could render SRM economically, socially and institutionally undesirable 
(low agreement, medium evidence). {4.3.8, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in 
this chapter}
Enabling Rapid and Far-Reaching Change 
The speed of transitions and of technological change required 
to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels has been 
observed in the past within specific sectors and technologies 
{4.2.2.1}. But the geographical and economic scales at which 
the required rates of change in the energy, land, urban, 
infrastructure and industrial systems would need to take place 
are larger and have no documented historic precedent  (limited 
evidence, medium agreement). To reduce inequality and alleviate 
poverty, such transformations would require more planning and 
stronger institutions (including inclusive markets) than observed in the 
past, as well as stronger coordination and disruptive innovation across 
actors and scales of governance. {4.3, 4.4}
Governance consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C and the 
political economy of adaptation and mitigation can enable and 
accelerate systems transitions, behavioural change, innovation and 
technology deployment (medium evidence, medium agreement). 
For 1.5°C-consistent actions, an effective governance framework 
would include: accountable multilevel governance that includes non-
state actors, such as industry, civil society and scientific institutions; 
coordinated sectoral and cross-sectoral policies that enable collaborative 
multi-stakeholder partnerships; strengthened global-to-local financial 
architecture that enables greater access to finance and technology; 
addressing climate-related trade barriers; improved climate education 
and greater public awareness; arrangements to enable accelerated 
behaviour change; strengthened climate monitoring and evaluation 
systems; and reciprocal international agreements that are sensitive 
to equity and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). System 
transitions can be enabled by enhancing the capacities of public, private 
and financial institutions to accelerate climate change policy planning 
and implementation, along with accelerated technological innovation, 
deployment and upkeep. {4.4.1, 4.4.2, 4.4.3, 4.4.4}
Behaviour change and demand-side management can 
significantly reduce emissions, substantially limiting the 
reliance on CDR to limit warming to 1.5°C {Chapter 2, 4.4.3}.
Political and financial stakeholders may find climate actions more cost-
effective and socially acceptable if multiple factors affecting behaviour 
are considered, including aligning these actions with people’s core 
values (medium evidence, high agreement). Behaviour- and lifestyle-
related measures and demand-side management have already led 
to emission reductions around the world and can enable significant 
future reductions (high confidence). Social innovation through bottom-
up initiatives can result in greater participation in the governance of 
systems transitions and increase support for technologies, practices 
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and policies that are part of the global response to limit warming to 
1.5°C . {Chapter 2, 4.4.1, 4.4.3, Figure 4.3} 
This rapid and far-reaching response required to keep warming 
below 1.5°C and enhance the capacity to adapt to climate risks 
would require large increases of investments in low-emission 
infrastructure and buildings, along with a redirection of financial 
flows towards low-emission investments (robust evidence, high 
agreement). An estimated mean annual incremental investment of 
around 1.5% of global gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) for the 
energy sector is indicated between 2016 and 2035, as well as about 
2.5% of global GFCF for other development infrastructure that could 
also address SDG implementation. Though quality policy design and 
effective implementation may enhance efficiency, they cannot fully 
substitute for these investments. {2.5.2, 4.2.1, 4.4.5}
Enabling this investment requires the mobilization and better 
integration of a range of policy instruments that include the 
reduction of socially inefficient fossil fuel subsidy regimes and innovative 
price and non-price national and international policy instruments. These 
would need to be complemented by de-risking financial instruments 
and the emergence of long-term low-emission assets. These instruments 
would aim to reduce the demand for carbon-intensive services and shift 
market preferences away from fossil fuel-based technology. Evidence 
and theory suggest that carbon pricing alone, in the absence of 
sufficient transfers to compensate their unintended distributional cross-
sector, cross-nation effects, cannot reach the incentive levels needed 
to trigger system transitions (robust evidence, medium agreement). 
But, embedded in consistent policy packages, they can help mobilize 
incremental resources and provide flexible mechanisms that help reduce 
the social and economic costs of the triggering phase of the transition 
(robust evidence, medium agreement). {4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.4.5}
Increasing evidence suggests that a climate-sensitive 
realignment of savings and expenditure towards low-emission, 
climate-resilient infrastructure and services requires an 
evolution of global and national financial systems. Estimates 
suggest that, in addition to climate-friendly allocation of public 
investments, a potential redirection of 5% to 10% of the annual 
capital revenues5 is necessary for limiting warming to 1.5°C {4.4.5, 
Table 1 in Box 4.8}. This could be facilitated by a change of incentives 
for private day-to-day expenditure and the redirection of savings 
from speculative and precautionary investments towards long-
term productive low-emission assets and services. This implies the 
mobilization of institutional investors and mainstreaming of climate 
finance within financial and banking system regulation. Access by 
developing countries to low-risk and low-interest finance through 
multilateral and national development banks would have to be 
facilitated (medium evidence, high agreement). New forms of public–
private partnerships may be needed with multilateral, sovereign and 
sub-sovereign guarantees to de-risk climate-friendly investments, 
support new business models for small-scale enterprises and help 
households with limited access to capital. Ultimately, the aim is to 
promote a portfolio shift towards long-term low-emission assets that 
would help redirect capital away from potentially stranded assets 
(medium evidence, medium agreement). {4.4.5}
Knowledge Gaps
Knowledge gaps around implementing and strengthening the 
global response to climate change would need to be urgently 
resolved if the transition to a 1.5°C world is to become reality. 
Remaining questions include: how much can be realistically expected 
from innovation and behavioural and systemic political and economic 
changes in improving resilience, enhancing adaptation and reducing 
GHG emissions? How can rates of changes be accelerated and scaled 
up? What is the outcome of realistic assessments of mitigation and 
adaptation land transitions that are compliant with sustainable 
development, poverty eradication and addressing inequality? What are 
life-cycle emissions and prospects of early-stage CDR options? How 
can climate and sustainable development policies converge, and how 
can they be organised within a global governance framework and 
financial system, based on principles of justice and ethics (including 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ 
(CBDR-RC)), reciprocity and partnership? To what extent would 
limiting warming to 1.5°C require a harmonization of macro-financial 
and fiscal policies, which could include financial regulators such as 
central banks? How can different actors and processes in climate 
governance reinforce each other, and hedge against the fragmentation 
of initiatives? {4.1, 4.3.7, 4.4.1, 4.4.5, 4.6}
5 Annual capital revenues are the paid interests plus the increase of the asset value.
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TS.5 Sustainable Development, Poverty 
Eradication and Reducing Inequalities
This chapter takes sustainable development as the starting point and 
focus for analysis. It considers the broad and multifaceted bi-directional 
interplay between sustainable development, including its focus on 
eradicating poverty and reducing inequality in their multidimensional 
aspects, and climate actions in a 1.5°C warmer world. These fundamental 
connections are embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs). The chapter also examines synergies and trade-offs of 
adaptation and mitigation options with sustainable development and 
the SDGs and offers insights into possible pathways, especially climate-
resilient development pathways towards a 1.5°C warmer world.
Sustainable Development, Poverty and Inequality 
in a 1.5°C Warmer World
Limiting global warming to 1.5°C rather than 2°C above pre-
industrial levels would make it markedly easier to achieve many 
aspects of sustainable development, with greater potential to 
eradicate poverty and reduce inequalities (medium evidence, high 
agreement). Impacts avoided with the lower temperature limit could 
reduce the number of people exposed to climate risks and vulnerable 
to poverty by 62 to 457 million, and lessen the risks of poor people 
to experience food and water insecurity, adverse health impacts, and 
economic losses, particularly in regions that already face development 
challenges (medium evidence, medium agreement). {5.2.2, 5.2.3} 
Avoided impacts expected to occur between 1.5°C and 2°C warming 
would also make it easier to achieve certain SDGs, such as those that 
relate to poverty, hunger, health, water and sanitation, cities and 
ecosystems (SDGs 1, 2, 3, 6, 11, 14 and 15) (medium evidence, high 
agreement). {5.2.3, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter}
Compared to current conditions, 1.5°C of global warming would 
nonetheless pose heightened risks to eradicating poverty, 
reducing inequalities and ensuring human and ecosystem well-
being (medium evidence, high agreement). Warming of 1.5°C is not 
considered ‘safe’ for most nations, communities, ecosystems and 
sectors and poses significant risks to natural and human systems as 
compared to the current warming of 1°C (high confidence). {Cross-
Chapter Box 12 in Chapter 5} The impacts of 1.5°C of warming would 
disproportionately affect disadvantaged and vulnerable populations 
through food insecurity, higher food prices, income losses, lost 
livelihood opportunities, adverse health impacts and population 
displacements (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.2.1} Some of 
the worst impacts on sustainable development are expected to be 
felt among agricultural and coastal dependent livelihoods, indigenous 
people, children and the elderly, poor labourers, poor urban dwellers in 
African cities, and people and ecosystems in the Arctic and Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS) (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.2.1, 
Box 5.3, Chapter 3, Box 3.5, Cross-Chapter Box 9 in Chapter 4}
Climate Adaptation and Sustainable Development
Prioritization of sustainable development and meeting the 
SDGs is consistent with efforts to adapt to climate change  (high 
confidence). Many strategies for sustainable development enable 
transformational adaptation for a 1.5°C warmer world, provided 
attention is paid to reducing poverty in all its forms and to promoting 
equity and participation in decision-making (medium evidence, high 
agreement). As such, sustainable development has the potential 
to significantly reduce systemic vulnerability, enhance adaptive 
capacity, and promote livelihood security for poor and disadvantaged 
populations (high confidence). {5.3.1}
Synergies between adaptation strategies and the SDGs are 
expected to hold true in a 1.5°C warmer world, across sectors 
and contexts (medium evidence, medium agreement). Synergies 
between adaptation and sustainable development are significant 
for agriculture and health, advancing SDGs 1 (extreme poverty), 
2 (hunger), 3 (healthy lives and well-being) and 6 (clean water) (robust 
evidence, medium agreement). {5.3.2} Ecosystem- and community-
based adaptation, along with the incorporation of indigenous and 
local knowledge, advances synergies with SDGs 5 (gender equality), 
10 (reducing inequalities) and 16 (inclusive societies), as exemplified 
in drylands and the Arctic (high evidence, medium agreement). {5.3.2, 
Box 5.1, Cross-Chapter Box 10 in Chapter 4}
Adaptation strategies can result in trade-offs with and 
among the SDGs (medium evidence, high agreement). Strategies 
that advance one SDG may create negative consequences for other 
SDGs, for instance SDGs 3 (health) versus 7 (energy consumption) 
and agricultural adaptation and SDG 2 (food security) versus SDGs 3 
(health), 5 (gender equality), 6 (clean water), 10 (reducing inequalities), 
14 (life below water) and 15 (life on the land) (medium evidence, 
medium agreement). {5.3.2}
Pursuing place-specific adaptation pathways towards a 
1.5°C warmer world has the potential for significant positive 
outcomes for well-being in countries at all levels of development 
(medium evidence, high agreement). Positive outcomes emerge when 
adaptation pathways (i) ensure a diversity of adaptation options based 
on people’s values and the trade-offs they consider acceptable, (ii) 
maximize synergies with sustainable development through inclusive, 
participatory and deliberative processes, and (iii) facilitate equitable 
transformation. Yet such pathways would be difficult to achieve 
without redistributive measures to overcome path dependencies, 
uneven power structures, and entrenched social inequalities (medium 
evidence, high agreement). {5.3.3}
Mitigation and Sustainable Development
The deployment of mitigation options consistent with 1.5°C 
pathways leads to multiple synergies across a range of 
sustainable development dimensions. At the same time, the 
rapid pace and magnitude of change that would be required to 
limit warming to 1.5°C, if not carefully managed, would lead to 
trade-offs with some sustainable development dimensions (high 
confidence). The number of synergies between mitigation response 
options and sustainable development exceeds the number of trade-
offs in energy demand and supply sectors; agriculture, forestry and 
other land use (AFOLU); and for oceans (very high confidence). {Figure 
5.2, Table 5.2 available at the end of the chapter} The 1.5°C pathways 
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indicate robust synergies, particularly for the SDGs 3 (health), 7 (energy), 
12 (responsible consumption and production) and 14 (oceans) (very 
high confidence). {5.4.2, Figure 5.3} For SDGs 1 (poverty), 2 (hunger), 
6 (water) and 7 (energy), there is a risk of trade-offs or negative side 
effects from stringent mitigation actions compatible with 1.5°C of 
warming (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.4.2}
Appropriately designed mitigation actions to reduce energy 
demand can advance multiple SDGs simultaneously. Pathways 
compatible with 1.5°C that feature low energy demand show the 
most pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs 
with respect to sustainable development and the SDGs (very high 
confidence). Accelerating energy efficiency in all sectors has synergies 
with SDGs 7 (energy), 9 (industry, innovation and infrastructure), 
11 (sustainable cities and communities), 12 (responsible consumption 
and production), 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions), and 
17 (partnerships for the goals) (robust evidence, high agreement). 
{5.4.1, Figure 5.2, Table 5.2} Low-demand pathways, which would 
reduce or completely avoid the reliance on bioenergy with carbon 
capture and storage (BECCS) in 1.5°C pathways, would result in 
significantly reduced pressure on food security, lower food prices and 
fewer people at risk of hunger (medium evidence, high agreement). 
{5.4.2, Figure 5.3}
The impacts of carbon dioxide removal options on SDGs depend 
on the type of options and the scale of deployment (high 
confidence). If poorly implemented, carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
options such as bioenergy, BECCS and AFOLU would lead to trade-
offs. Appropriate design and implementation requires considering 
local people’s needs, biodiversity and other sustainable development 
dimensions (very high confidence). {5.4.1.3, Cross-Chapter Box 7 in 
Chapter 3}
The design of the mitigation portfolios and policy instruments 
to limit warming to 1.5°C will largely determine the overall 
synergies and trade-offs between mitigation and sustainable 
development (very high confidence). Redistributive policies that 
shield the poor and vulnerable can resolve trade-offs for a range 
of SDGs (medium evidence, high agreement). Individual mitigation 
options are associated with both positive and negative interactions 
with the SDGs (very high confidence). {5.4.1} However, appropriate 
choices across the mitigation portfolio can help to maximize positive 
side effects while minimizing negative side effects (high confidence). 
{5.4.2, 5.5.2} Investment needs for complementary policies resolving 
trade-offs with a range of SDGs are only a small fraction of the overall 
mitigation investments in 1.5°C pathways (medium evidence, high 
agreement). {5.4.2, Figure 5.4} Integration of mitigation with adaptation 
and sustainable development compatible with 1.5°C warming requires 
a systems perspective (high confidence). {5.4.2, 5.5.2}
Mitigation consistent with 1.5°C of warming create high risks 
for sustainable development in countries with high dependency 
on fossil fuels for revenue and employment generation (high 
confidence). These risks are caused by the reduction of global demand 
affecting mining activity and export revenues and challenges to rapidly 
decrease high carbon intensity of the domestic economy (robust 
evidence, high agreement). {5.4.1.2, Box 5.2} Targeted policies that 
promote diversification of the economy and the energy sector could 
ease this transition (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.4.1.2, 
Box 5.2}
Sustainable Development Pathways to 1.5°C
Sustainable development broadly supports and often enables 
the fundamental societal and systems transformations that 
would be required for limiting warming to 1.5°C above pre-
industrial levels (high confidence). Simulated pathways that 
feature the most sustainable worlds (e.g., Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways (SSP) 1) are associated with relatively lower mitigation and 
adaptation challenges and limit warming to 1.5°C at comparatively 
lower mitigation costs. In contrast, development pathways with high 
fragmentation, inequality and poverty (e.g., SSP3) are associated with 
comparatively higher mitigation and adaptation challenges. In such 
pathways, it is not possible to limit warming to 1.5°C for the vast 
majority of the integrated assessment models (medium evidence, 
high agreement). {5.5.2} In all SSPs, mitigation costs substantially 
increase in 1.5°C pathways compared to 2°C pathways. No pathway 
in the literature integrates or achieves all 17 SDGs (high confidence). 
{5.5.2} Real-world experiences at the project level show that the 
actual integration between adaptation, mitigation and sustainable 
development is challenging as it requires reconciling trade-offs across 
sectors and spatial scales (very high confidence). {5.5.1}
Without societal transformation and rapid implementation 
of ambitious greenhouse gas reduction measures, pathways 
to limiting warming to 1.5°C and achieving sustainable 
development will be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, 
to achieve (high confidence). The potential for pursuing such 
pathways differs between and within nations and regions, due to 
different development trajectories, opportunities and challenges (very 
high confidence). {5.5.3.2, Figure 5.1} Limiting warming to 1.5°C 
would require all countries and non-state actors to strengthen their 
contributions without delay. This could be achieved through sharing 
efforts based on bolder and more committed cooperation, with support 
for those with the least capacity to adapt, mitigate and transform 
(medium evidence, high agreement). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.2} Current 
efforts towards reconciling low-carbon trajectories and reducing 
inequalities, including those that avoid difficult trade-offs associated 
with transformation, are partially successful yet demonstrate notable 
obstacles (medium evidence, medium agreement). {5.5.3.3, Box 5.3, 
Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}
Social justice and equity are core aspects of climate-resilient 
development pathways for transformational social change. 
Addressing challenges and widening opportunities between 
and within countries and communities would be necessary 
to achieve sustainable development and limit warming to 
1.5°C, without making the poor and disadvantaged worse off 
(high confidence). Identifying and navigating inclusive and socially 
acceptable pathways towards low-carbon, climate-resilient futures is a 
challenging yet important endeavour, fraught with moral, practical and 
political difficulties and inevitable trade-offs (very high confidence). 
{5.5.2, 5.5.3.3, Box 5.3} It entails deliberation and problem-solving 
processes to negotiate societal values, well-being, risks and resilience 
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and to determine what is desirable and fair, and to whom (medium 
evidence, high agreement). Pathways that encompass joint, iterative 
planning and transformative visions, for instance in Pacific SIDS 
like Vanuatu and in urban contexts, show potential for liveable and 
sustainable futures (high confidence). {5.5.3.1, 5.5.3.3, Figure 5.5, 
Box 5.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13 in this chapter}
The fundamental societal and systemic changes to achieve 
sustainable development, eradicate poverty and reduce 
inequalities while limiting warming to 1.5°C would require 
meeting a set of institutional, social, cultural, economic and 
technological conditions (high confidence). The coordination 
and monitoring of policy actions across sectors and spatial scales 
is essential to support sustainable development in 1.5°C warmer 
conditions (very high confidence). {5.6.2, Box 5.3} External funding 
and technology transfer better support these efforts when they 
consider recipients’ context-specific needs (medium evidence, high 
agreement). {5.6.1} Inclusive processes can facilitate transformations 
by ensuring participation, transparency, capacity building and iterative 
social learning (high confidence). {5.5.3.3, Cross-Chapter Box 13, 
5.6.3} Attention to power asymmetries and unequal opportunities 
for development, among and within countries, is key to adopting 
1.5°C-compatible development pathways that benefit all populations 
(high confidence). {5.5.3, 5.6.4, Box 5.3} Re-examining individual and 
collective values could help spur urgent, ambitious and cooperative 
change (medium evidence, high agreement). {5.5.3, 5.6.5}
